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COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-DEVELOPMENTS: 1940-1945 (A SERVICE
FOR RETURNING VETERANs)*-No period in American history has
ushered in more sweeping changes in the legal structure than has the
last decade and a half. No area of the law has witnessed more rapid
development than has administrative law. A sketch _of the progress of
administrative law during the five-year period 1940 to 1945 reveals

* This comment is the third in a series of comments ·on recent developments in
the various fields of the law published and to be published by the REVIEW as a service
for returning veterans. See announcement, 44 MICH. L. REv. 149 (1945).
Previously published: Tracy, Evidence, 44 MICH. L. REv. 448 (1945); Waite,
Criminal Law, 44 M1cH. L. REV. 631 (1946).
Appearing also in this issue: Simes, Trusts and Estates, 44 MICH. L. REV. (1946).
To be published: Shartel, Constitutional Law; James, Corporation Law; Bradway, Domestic Relations; Ohlinger, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice; Winters, State
Adoption of the Federal Rules; Russell A. Smith, Labor Law; Arthur M. Smith,
Patent Law; Thurston, Restitution; Kauper, Taxation; Leidy, Torts; Oppenheim,
Trade Regulations.
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.an important refining of the "quasi judicial" procedures-procedures
which, because of their swift and topsy-turvy growth, can well use a
little refining.
The purpose of the following survey is two-fold; first, to outline
the more significant developments of the last half decade, relating the
new materials to the earlier doctrines and cases, thus furnishing a
framework both for refreshing in the earlier law and familiarizing with
the more recent; and, second, to furnish by suggestion and documentation sufficient bibliographical and other material to enable anyone who
is seriously interested, to pursue on his own initiative a more intensive
examination of the progress of administrative law during the war years.
There is no pretense of exhaustive exposition; there is merely a suggestive survey. Moreover, the survey concerns only the procedural
aspects of the law of administrative agencies. No attempt is made to
invade the vast reaches of substantive law enforced by them.
Recent Statutory Developments in Administrative Law
Doubtless the most widely advertised statutory developments in
administrative law of the war years have been the special war agencies,
intended to guide the economy of the nation through the processes of
war conversion and reconversion. The War Production Board,1 the
Office of Price Administration,2 the National War Labor Board,3 and
other war agencies 4 have indeed fulfilled a most important function
since Pearl Harbor. They have affected every man, woman, and child,
and every business in the land. Without them it is scarcely conceivable
that the war could have been prosecuted effectively or the national
economy kept on an even keel. However, their temporary character,
their "emergency" quality, and the fact that they are either Jiquidated
or destined to be summarily brought to an end in the near future,
1
The War Production Board was first established by Executive Order 9024,
dated January 16, 1942. It was set up within the Office for Emergency Management
of the Executive Office of the President. The board was finally liquidated by Executive Order 9638, dated October 4, 1945, and its powers were transferred to the
Civilian Production Administration in the Office of Emergency Management.
2
The Office of Price Administration was established by Executive Order 8734,
dated April II, 1941. It enforced the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56
Stat. L. 23, 50 U.S.C. (19-40) § 901.
8
The National War Labor Board was established by Executive Order 9017,
dated January 12, 1942. Additional authority was conferred by the so-called War
Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act of June 25, 1943.
4 A useful document for reference purposes, setting forth in brief compass the
organization, powers, and personnel of all federal government agencies, is the UNITED
· STATES GoVERNMENT MANUAL, published by the Division of Public Inquiries of the
Office of War Information.
Detailed information concerning the war agency powers, rules, orders, decisions,
etc., may best be obtained by reference to the standard loose-leaf services.
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results in their having had but little effect upon the permanent course
of administrative law.
Much more significant from the long range point of view are certain powerful contemporary movements toward statutory reform of
administrative procedure. Such reforms are definitely on the way. They
spring from a profound apprehension over the rapid growth of more
or less uncontrolled administrative powers. They are being brought to
pass by the diligent efforts of many intelligent specialists, whose interests lie in aiding the wise assimilation of modern administrative methods into a constitutional system in which bureaucratic absolutism finds
itself a most unwelcome guest.
Antecedent to the actual enactment of reform legislation on administrative procedure, recent years have brought forth a series of notable
reports, all of which have recommended legislation to bring about organizational and procedural improvements in the administrative system. These reports have appeared from time to time during the past
fifteen years, but the last five years have been especially fruitful. Because of their influence upon reform measures, as well as for the wealth
of valuable information contained in them concerning administrative
law and procedure, they have become milestones in the progress of
administrative law. The principal documents in the series are as follows:
(1) Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers, 1932, (A
British document) .11 This report deals with administrative law in England, but it served to stimulate constructive efforts on this side of the
Atlantic and should therefore be regarded as a forerunner of the domestic efforts to improve administrative justice.
(2) Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, 1937.6 This report declares among other things that the federal "independent" regulatory commissions can more accurately be
called "the 'irresponsible' regulatory commissions, for they are areas
of unaccountability."
(3) Reports of the Special Committee on Administrative Law of
the American Bar Association, 1933-1943.7 These reports contain a
11
Presented by the Lord High Chancellor to Parliament, by Command of His
Majesty, April, 1932.
6
Transmitted to the President January 8, 1937, and by him transmitted to
Congress in accordance with Public Law No. 739, 74th Cong., 2d sess.
7
1933 Report, 58 A.B.A. Rep. 407 (L. G. Caldwell, Chairman); 1934 Report,
59 A.B.A. Rep. 539 (L. G. Caldwell, Chairman); 1936 Report, 61 A.B.A. Rep. 720
(0. R. McGuire, Chairman); 1937 Report, 62 A.B.A. Rep. 789 (0. R. McGuire,
Chairman); 1938 Report, 63 A.B.A. Rep. 331 (R. Pound, Chairman); 1939 Report,
64 A.B.A. Rep. 575 (O.R. McGuire, Chairman); 1940 Report, 65 A.B.A. Rep. 215
(0. R. McGuire, Chairman); 1941 Report, 66 A.B.A. Rep. 439 (0. R. McGuire,
Chairman); 1943 Report, 68 A.B.A. Rep. 249 (Carl McFarland, Chairman).
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wealth of valuable material, and in the course of ten ye~rs they have
offered thre~ quite different types of statutory proposals for administrative reform. First came a proposal for a Federal Administrative
Court. This died an early death. Then came the so-called WalterLogan Bill, passed by Congress, but very wisely vetoed by the President. Finally the committee recommended the McCarran-Sumners
Bill, now before Congress, known as S7 and HR 1290. This measure
may become law before this survey is printed.
{4) Reports of the Committee on Administrative Agencies and
Tribunals of the Section on Judicial Administration of the American
Bar Association, 1938, 1939.8 These reports dealt primarily with state
administrative procedure, and set forth a recommended bill for the
improvement thereof.
(5) Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, 1941.9 This is the most elaborate, comprehensive,"
and objective survey to date of federal administrative agencies and
procedures. It includes two bills recommended to Congress to correct
i:leficiencies in the administrative process. One bill was proposed by
the majority and another by a minority of the committee. The latter
bill was subsequently approved in principle by the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association. It provided the framework from
which the present McCarran-Sumners Bill has been developed'. The
Attorney General's Committee Report is accompanied by detailed
monographic studies of twenty.-nine of the more important federal
agencies.
(6) Report on Administrative Adjudication in the State of New
York, 1942.10 This is by all odds the best available study of state ads 1938 Report, 63 A.B.A. Rep. 623 (Ralph Hoyt, Chairman); 1939 Report, 64
A.B:A. Rep. 407 (Ralph Hoyt, Chairman).
9 Published by U. S. Government Printing Office, 1941, pp. 474. This report
has been widely acclaimed by students of administrative law. For a selected list of the
- numerous reviews, see Jaffe, "The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure," 8 UNIV, CHI. L. REV. 401 (1941); Hart, "The Acheson
Report: A Critique," 26 lowA L. REv. 801 (1941); Horak, "Administrative Procedure: A Report and an Evaluation," 26 WASH. UNiv. L. Q. 492 (1941); Frankfurter,
"The Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,"
41 CoL. L. REv. 585 (1941); Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of
Age," Id. at 589; Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative
Procedure," Id. at 617; Davison, "Management and Allocation of Voting Power in
Corporate Reorganization," Id. at 646.
1 Known as the "Benjamin Report" because it was prepared by Robert M.
Benjamin of the New· York Bar, who served as Commissioner under section 8 of the
New York Executive Law, authorized and directed to study and report on state quasijudicial procedures. , This report, too, has been widely acclaimed and favorably reviewed. See, for example, Jaffe, "Administrative Procedure Re-Examined-The
Benjamin Report," 56 HARV, L. REv. 704 (1943); Hart, "The Benjamin Report
on Administrative Adjudication," 2r TEX. L. REv. 277 (1943).
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ministrative law. Like the Attorney General's Committee Report, it
is a competent and objective discussion of both theory and practice.
(7) Report of the ,Judicial Council of California on Administrative Agencies Survey, 1944.11 This is a report which resulted in the
adoption in 1945 by the California State Legislature of some important
remedial legislation.
(8) Reports of the Committee of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1940--1943.12 The National
Conference has been working for several years on a draft of a Model
State Administrative Procedure Act, a measure which will, no doubt,
be given final approval in the near future. The content of the draft
is described in the footnote.
The foregoing reports are symptomatic of the ferment going on
everywhere in the land. They constitute a valuable contribution to
current thinking on a vital subject, but even more importantly, they
and other similar activities are bearing fruit in the form of remedial
legislation. In several states the legislatures have already adopted
statutes prescribing fair administrative procedures, either for all or for
some of their administrative agencies. In other states bills of like purport have been introduced and have received consideration, although
they have not yet been enacted into law. But they are on their way.
There is a general realization abroad in the land of the need of assimilating administrative processes into our juristic system in a manner
calculated to assure fair play as well as efficiency. The new legislation
is responsive to that urge. It is undoubtedly the most significant development of the war years in administrative law. For ready reference
a list of these remedial enactments is herewith set forth. •
11

TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE OF CALIFORNIA, December 3 I, I 944.
12 See NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS HANDBOOK FOR 1943, p. 226
et. seq., for the draft as revised to September, 1943. The 1943 draft has been again
revised but the final revision is not available in printed form.
The draft model deals primarily with major principles, not with minor matters
of procedural detail. There are certain basic principlc:;s of common sense, justice, and
fair play that are deemed to be an irreducible minimum, and as such are embodied in
the provisions of the measure. These are:
(I) Assurance of proper publicity for administrative rules that affect the public;
(2) Provisions for advance determinations, or "declaratory judgments," on the
validity of administrative rules, and provision for "declaratory rulings" affording
advance understanding of the application of administrative rules to particular cases;
(3) Guaranties of fundamental fairness in administrative hearings, particularly
in regard to rules of evidence and the taking of official notice in quasi-judicial proceedings;
·
(4) Provisions assuring personal familarity on the part of the responsible agency
heads with the evidence in the quasi-judicial cases decided by them;
(5) Assurance of proper scope of judicial review of administrative orders to
guarantee correction of administrative errors.
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(1) North Dakota-Uniform Practice Act. 13 Adopted in 1941,
this act was the first of the general remedial acts. It specifies basic procedures, both for rule making and for ap.judication, somewhat along the
lines of the National Conference of Commissioners Model Act hereinbefore mentioned.
( 2) Wisconsin,-Uniform Administrative Procedure Act.14 Adopted in 1943, this act was modeled closely on the National Conference
of Commissioners Bill. In the Wisconsin legislature it was especially
acclaimed as an important procedural reform.
(3) North Carolina-Revocation of License Act.15 Adopted in
1943, this act prohibits the cancellation of certain specified types of
licenses without prior notice and hearing, and provides for appeal of
cancellation orders to the Superior Courts, where the causes are tried
to juries, using the same evidence as that introduced at the administrative hearings.
(4) Ohio-Uniform Administrative Procedure Act.16 Also adopted
in l 943 on recommendation of a special administrative law commission
created by the preceding legislature, this act prescribes procedure for
licensing agencies-licensing being broadly defined to include all
orders determining "the rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal
relationships of a specified person or persons."
(5) California-Three Acts: Administrative Procedure Act,11 Division of Administrative Procedure Act,18 Judicial Review Procedure.19
These acts, adopted in 1945, were the result of two years of careful and
thorough study by the California Judicial Council. The council took
advantage of previous studies and legislation, with the result that the
provisions are exceedingly well-considered and effectively drafted.
The statutory measures just enumerated are much more than just
five new statutes. They are the beginnings of a codification movement
that in a decade will sweep throughout the country. Especially if the
McCarran-Sumners Bill, sponsored by the American Bar Association,
North Dakota, Laws (1941) c. 240 N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§28-3201 to
28-3222. See Hoyt, "North Dakota Leads in Administrative Law Field," 25 J.
AM. Juo. Soc. 114 (1941).
14
Wisconsin., Laws (1943) c. 375. For a careful discussion of the measure, see
Hoyt, "The Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act," 1944 Wis. L. REV. 214-239.
15
North Carolina, Gen. Stat. (1943) §§ 150-1 to 150-8.
16
Ohio, Gen. Code (Page, Supp.- 1943) §§154-61 to 154-73. For a brief
description of the work of the Ohio Administrative Commission that drafted the bill,
see 15 OHIO ST. B. REP. 581 (1943).
11
California, Administrative Proced1;1re Act, Cal. Stats. (1945) c. 867; Cal.
Govt. Code (Deering, Supp. 1945) §§ 11500-u528.
18 California, Division of Administrative Procedure Act, Cal. Stats. (1945) c.
869; Cal. Business and Professions Code (Deering, Supp. 1945) §§ II0.5, II0.6.
19 CaliforniQ, Judicial Review Procedure, Cal. Stats. (1945) c. 868; Cal. code
Civ. Proc. (Deering, Supp. 1945) § 1094.5.
13
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becomes a law, and a code of fair administrative procedure is thereby
imposed upon federal administrative agencies, we may confidently
expect that every state in the Union will shortly re-examine its state
administrative procedures and prescribe fair and reasonable standards
with respect thereto. Indeed, if court practice is successfully and properly made subject to judicature acts and court rules, no good reason
can be conceived why administrative practice should not be similarly
subjected to the guiding influence of reasonable standards of action.
Although there is resistance in some quarters to such codification, nevertheless it is responsive to an insistent need. The arguments for it, as
applied to federal agencies, are briefly stated in the minority report of
the Attorney General's Committee, as follows:
"In some quarters there is fear of unduly hampering the freedom
of action of administrative agencies (by an administrative procedure
act), and a conviction that it is either impossible or unwise to provide
legislation for the great variety of administrative subjects and processes. The answer, we think, is to identify the few basic considerations
and express them in legislative statements of policy, of principles, or of
standards for the guidance of administration, subject always to reasonable variations to meet varying needs. Modern legislation, by which the
most intimate and vital interests of society are governed, is cast for the
better part in similar terms. To say that man can be so governed, but
that agencies of the state cannot or should not be so governed, is a
recognition of rejected forms of government. To govern the courts
by weighty tradition, a bulky "Judicial Code," and uniform rules of
practice, but to give administrators only slight statutory attention is at
least questionable in a democracy.
" ... Without impairing government, a legislative statement of
principles will go far toward dispelling the cloud that hovers over the
administrative process. It will guide administrators and protect the
citizen far more than the judicial review of particular administrative
cases, which is available only to those few who can· afford it. What is
needed is not a detailed code but a set of principles and a statement of
legislative policy. The prescribed pattern need not be, and should not
be, a rigid mold. There should be ample room for necessary changes
- and full allowance for differing needs of different agencies.
"Such a statement would be of invaluable assistance to the private
persons on whom powers of government impinge, for they could learn
more readily and clearly when, where, and how to proceed. Greater
cooperation with Government officials would be assured. It would be of
inestimable value to government itself by helping to alleviate the disrespect, distrust, and fear now felt by too large a percentage of citizens.
Finally, there is reason to believe that administrative officials would
welcome the assistance of general procedural instruction which, instead
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of leaving them groping in the dark, would furnish a pattern of action." 20
The abov~ mentioned reports urging statutory formulation of
procedural standards for administrative agencies, and the beginnings of
enactment of remedial legislation are undoubtedly the outstanding
features in the path of progress of administrative law during the half
decade r 940 to r 945.
Recent Court Decisions Concerning Administrative Procedure
The war years have seemingly ushered in a respite in new judicial
pronouncements on administrative procedure. During the last five
years there have been scarcely more than a score of decisions that have
made a substantial contribution. And even such decisions as have been
handed down have been of the clarifying and refining variety, rather
than the sources of novel doctrines. In the following pages the principle cases are cited, their general purport stated, the law re"."iew comments footnoted; but no attempt is made to discuss the cases or to do
more than suggest the trend of judicial thought.
Legislative Standards and Administrative Discretion. The Emergency Price Control Act of r 942 furnished a setting for a reconsideration of the constitutional prohibition on delegation of legislative power
-a doctrine that played sach a pro,minent part in the ·demise of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, held invalid in ALA Schecter Poultry Corporation v. United States. The Price Control Act conferred
authority on the administrator to fix such prices and rents as might be
"general, fair and equitable" and as would "e:ffectuate the purposes of
the act," but in fixing them he was required to give "due consideration"
to rents and prices in the "base period" fixed by Congress in the act. ·
Without overruling the Schecter case, the court sustained both price
control (Yakus v. United States) and rent control (Bowles v. Willingham). The court held that Congress had adopted sufficiently precise
standards and had sufficiently circumscribed administrative discretion so
that the doctrine of delegation of legislative power was properly satisfied. The decisions thus help to prick the line marking the boundary
of Virmissible delegation, and serve to assure Congress of the propriety
of the drafting technique now employed in delegating legislative authority to administrative agencies.21

°
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p. 2 I 5 ( I 941) •
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660 (1943), and Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 641 '(1944). Justice Roberts, who dissented in
both cases, felt that the majority opinions overruled Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S., Ct. 837 (1935).
For law review discussions of the two cases, see 30 CoRN. L. Q. 504 (1945);
36 lowA L. REv. 288 (1945); 7 GA. B. J. 254 (1944).
PROCEDURE,
21
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Necessity of Affording Notice 'and Opportunity for Hearing. The
basic right to notice and opportunity to be heard before one's rights
are foreclosed by administrative action, is too well established to have
received much further attention during recent years.22 Nevertheless,
certain questions lying on the fringe of the basic principle arise from
time to time. For example, the United States Supreme Court has been
obliged in several instances to pass upon the hearing rights of collateral
parties, i.e., persons not directly in the line of fire of an administrative
order. To illustrate, in 1938, in the Pennsylvania Greyhound case, the
cqurt held that a "company dominated" union was not entitled to a
notice and hearing in a National Labor Relations Board proceeding
resulting in the disestablishment of the union.28 But in the same year
in the Consolidated Edison case the court held that "independent"
· unions were entitled to notice and hearing before the entry of a Labor
Board order invalidating contracts with such unions. 24 In 1940, a somewhat similar question arose in the National Licorice Company case.
It appeared that through the good offices of a company dominated
union, the company had entered into individual employment contracts
with its employees. Such action was held to be a violation of the Wagner Act in a Labor Board proceedjng in which the contracting employees were not parties. A cease and desist order was issued. The
Supreme Court on appeal held that the employees were not "necessary" parties, that the board could proceed to a final order without
making the employees parties to ·the proceedings, but that employees'
rights under the contracts could not be reduced by the board's order.25
Thus the court is gradually working out the boundary lines of indispensability of parties.
In still another important area of administrative action the rights of
collateral parties have been recently extended and clarified. For years
there has been uncertainty and doubt in the statutes, the regulations,
and the judicial decisions, concerning the rights of a broadcasting
licensee to intervene or appeal under the Federal Communications Act
when a competing broadcasting license is granted or an existing license
is modified to work economic injury or to interfere electrically with
station operation. Under what circumstances can the owners of stations
so injured intervene in proceedings hefore the commission, or appeal
to the courts? Without elaborating the ramifications of a complex phase
22
See Davis, "The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative Process," 51 YALE L. J. 1093 (1942).
28
N.L.R.B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 58 S. Ct. 571
(1938).
24
Consolidated Edison Company v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206
(1938).
'
25
National Licorice Company v, N.L.R.B., 309 U.S. 350, 60 S. Ct. 569 (1940).
See 40 CoL. L. REV. 898-902 (1940).
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of the law, suffice it to say that two recent Supreme Court decisions have
materially broadened and clarified the rights of intervention and appeal, both when economic injury is alleged,26 and when electrical interference is claimed.27
- Securing Information by Subpoena or Other Compulsory Process.
Three important decisions of the last five years have virtually set to
rest all constitutional doubts regarding the scope and power of the
administrative subpoena. Not so many years ago there was good authority for the proposition that compulsory process could only be used
against private business ( as distinguished from public utilities) when
there existed some reason to believe that a violation of the law had been
or was being committed. No less a liberal than Justice Holmes
once espoused the cause of limitation of the·· subpoena to "the cases
where the sacrifice of privacy is neces~ary-those where the investigations concern a specific breach of the law." 28 However, by virtue of '
the decisions in Fleming v. Montgomery Ward and Company, Endicott-Johnson Corporation v. Perkins, and, within recent weeks, Oklahoma Press Publishing Company v. Walling, all doubts are removed.
If the administrative subpoena is not too broad or too indefinite, and if
it calls for materials relevant to a legitimate administrative purpose,
private business as well as public utilities must respond. Like the goldfish in a glass bowl, privacy is thus reduced to a minimum in the face
of superior governmental needs. 29
The Hearing; Rules of Evidence; Official Notice. The hearing
stage of "quasi-judicial" action has also been subjected to the refining
process during the last half decade. The preceding decade brought the
famous Morgan case in 1936. Morgan's troubles not only ran into
26 Federal Communications Comm. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Co., 309 U.S. 470,
60 S. Ct. 692 (1940), holding that the one who suffers economic injury may appeal
as an "aggrieved person," provided he presents on the appeal a question of "public
interest and convenience."
27 Federal Communications Comm. v. National Broadcasting Company, 319 U.S.
239, 63 S. Ct. 1035 (1943), affording both the right of intervention and the right
of appeal to the competitor who suffers electrical interference. See 52 YALE Li J.
671-679 (1943).
For an excellent general discussion, see Oberst, "Parties to Administrative Proceedings," 40 MICH. L. REv. 378-405 (1942).
28 Justice Holmes in Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 21 I
U.S.
407, 20 S. Ct. 115 (1908). This doctrine reached full flower in Jones v. Securities
and Exchange Comm., 298 U.S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 654 (1936) (Justices Cardozo, Brandeis,
and Stone, dissenting).
29 Fleming v. Montgomery Ward Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 384, cert.
den., 311 U.S. 690, 61 S. Ct. 71 (1940), Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317
U.S. 501, 63 S. Ct. 339 (1943); Oklahoma Press Puhl. Co. v. Walling, #61, #63,
October 1945 term, decided February 11, 1946.
For periodical discussion of the entire problem, see I BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 137140 (1940); 52 YALE L. J. 175-81 (1943); 40 MICH. L. REV. 78-84 (1941).
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several new editions in 1938 and 1939, but they persisted to figure in
yet another decision in 1941. The Morgan series has really made a
great contribution to formulation of proper standards for administrative
hearings. Many procedural features have been discussed and subjected
to the clarification that can only come from authoritative expression
from the nation's highest tribunal. The requirement of clear statement
of the claims of the opposing party, the right to submit argument, the
intermediate report prep;;i.red by the trial examiner, the use of subordinates to sift and ·analyse the evidence, the probing of the mental
processes of the agency heads, the question of "bias"-all these and
other procedural phases have been discussed. The Morgan series has
, done its bit for administrative law.80 Another hearing case of considerable value was Inland Steel Company v. National Labor Relations
Board, decided in I 940 by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh
Circuit. 81 The trial examiner in that proceeding was taught by the
court of appeals that it was his duty to serve in a fair and impartial
manner, and that the bias and partiality displayed by him could not
be tolerated. Still another clarifying decision was rendered in Opp
Cotton Mills, Incorporated v. Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division. 32 One of the questions raised by the company had to do with
the character of the evidence relied upon by the administrator in support of his findings. Much of it was clearly hearsay (reports, statistical
data, etc.), utterly incompetent in a court of law. It was, nevertheless,
regarded by the Supreme Court as adequate to sustain the administrator's wage order. Administrative proceedings, especially where they
are "legislative" in character, are not to be deemed jury trials; and it
is becoming increasingly apparent that the courts are going to apply
standards of evidence quite different from those evolved to insulate
juries from the contaminating influences of testimonay of low probative
value. Judge Learned Hand's famous statement concerning the use
of hearsay seems to be accepted with increasing frequency. In the
Remington-Rand case he said that no doubt "mere rumor" would not
serve to support a finding, "but hearsay may do so, at least if more is
80

Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936); 304 U.S. 1, 58
S. Ct. 773 (1938); 304 U.S. 23, 58 S. Ct. 999 (1938); 307 U.S. 183, 59 S. Ot.
795 (1939); 313 U.S. 409, 61 S. Ct. 999 (1941).
The cases have been much discussed in the law reviews. See, for example, Doyle,
"Federal Administrative Hearings: Significance of the Morgan Case," 19 NEB. L.
BuL. 125-45 (1940); Pearlman, "The Effect of the Morgan Decisions on the Position
of the Trial Examiner," IO GEo. WASH. L. REv. 43-62 (1941); Sears, "The Morgan
Case and Administrative Procedure," 7 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 726 (19:39).
81
109 F. (2d) 9 (1940).
82
312 U.S. 126, 61 S. Ct. 524 (1941). For comment on this case, see Fuch,
"Constitutional Implications of the Opp Cotton Mills Case," 27 WASH. UNiv. L. REV.
I (1941); also 35 ILL. L. REv. 840-60 (1941); 29 GEo. L. J. 882-8 (1941).
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not conveniently available, and if in the end the finding is supported
by the kind of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed
to rely in serious affairs." 83
. Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions. Judicial review, a
subject once deemed so important in administrative law, has gradually
moved into se~ond place, giving way to greater emphasis upon the improvement of procedure before the agencies themselves. Nevertheless, the methods and scope of court redress of administrative error
continue to occupy a prominent place on the stage, althi:rngh the last
five years have added but little that is really new. The evolution of
doctrines of judicial review of. administrative decisions began in I 890
with the decision in Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Company v. Minnesota. 84 The principal outlines of the scope of review have
been reiterated again and again, and the number of doubtful points are
now but few. Arbitrary administrative action will be set aside. Administrative decisions on fact issues, if supported by "substantive evidence," will be sustained.85 Questions of "constitutional fact" were
once supposed to be reserved for independent reexamination and determination by the courts,86 but the doctrine was limited in its scope, and
its foundations were shaken, if not shattered, in 1940, when the ·Su83 National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d, 1938)
94 F. (2d) 862 at 873.
'
.
For periodical discussion of the entire problem of evidence in administrative proceedings, see Davis, "An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process," 55 HARV. L. REv. 365 (1942); Norwood, "Administrative Evidence in
Practice;'' IO GEo. WASH. L. REv. l 5 ( l 941) ; Hoyt, "Some Practical Problems Met
in the Trial of Cases before Administrative Tribunals," 25 MINN. L. REv. 545
(1941); Merrill, "Rules of Evidence in Adlllinistrative Proceedings,", 14 OKLA.
B.A.J. 1934 (1943).
In regard to the taking of official notice by administra;ive agencies, mention
should be made of a valuable article by Gellhorn, "Official Notice in Administrative
Adjudication," 20 TEx. L. REV. 131 (1941):
84 134 U.S. 418, IO S. Ct. 462 (1890).
8 ~ For a complete review of the substantial evidence rule, both in statutes and in
case law, see Stason, "'Substantial Evidence' in Administrative Law," 89 Umv. PA.
L. REv. 1026-51 (1941).
'
The present attitude of the Supreme Court on fact questions has been adequately
stated by Justice Stone in Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 321 U.S. 678, 64 S. Ct. 830 (1944), as follows: "It has now long been settled
that findings of the Board • . . are conclusive upon reviewing courts when supported
by substantial evidence, that the weighing of conflicting evidence is for the Board and
not the courts, that inferem;:es from the evidence are to be drawn by the Board
and not by the courts, save only as questions of law are raised, and that upon such
questions of law, the experienced judgment of the Board is entitled to great weight."
86 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527
(1920); Crowell V. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932); St. Joseph Stock
Yards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720 (1936).
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preme Court handed down its decision in an oil proration case, Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Rowan and Nichols Oil Company. 81 The case
has certain features which may distinguish it from earlier decisions.
The court does not expressly overrule the prior decisions, but at least
it is made clear that in the oil proration field the courts will not reexamine the facts independently, even though unconstitutional confiscation is alleged. Just how generally the new doctrine will be applied to
other constitutional fact questions remains in doubt. Finally, the last
stronghold of the judicial branch, "the question of law," seems no
longer to be a simon-pure judicial question, subject to independent
court review. Even on such matt~rs, the decision of the administrative
tribunal is now deemed "entitled to great weight" when brought up for
court review. 88 In short, administrative decisions both on law and on
fact, both constitutional and otherwise, have now attained measurable
finality and maturity of stature. They have come of age.
By way of conclusion of this survey,3° it may be said that the fiveyear period, including the years of World War II, have witnessed two
important progressive changes in administrative law, first, the embryonic beginnings of some notable statutory reforms of administrative
procedure, and second, a further refining of the administrative process
37 310 U.S. 573, 60 S. Ct. 1021 (1940). For discussion see 39 M1cH. L. REV.
438 (1941); 51 YALE L.J. 680 (1942).
88 See "Supreme Court Evaluation of Administrative Determinations of Law:
1932-1942," 56 HARV. L. REV. l00 (1942).
89 This survey would not be complete without the inclusion for reference purposes
of several interesting treatises on administrative law, that have been published during
the last five-year period. The following are suggested:
I. CARR, CoNcERNING ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Carpentier Foundation
Lectures) (1941).
.
2. CHAMBERLAIN, DOWLING & HAYS, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1942).
3. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941).
4. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (Schouler Lectures)
(1941).
5• HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-WITH SELECTED CASES

(1940).
6. VoM BAUER, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (1942).
Finally, the following additional law review-articles not hitherto cited should be
included for reference purposes:
1. Davison, "Administrative Legislation," 34 ILL. L. REv. 651 (1940).
2. McAllister, "Administrative Adjudication and Judicial Review," 34 ILL.
L. REv. 680 (1940).
3. Dickinson, "Administrative Management, Administrative Regulation and the
Judicial Process," 89 U1hv. PA. L. REv. 1052 (1941).
4. Dickinson, "Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations, A Summary
and Evaluation," 25 MINN. L. REv. 588 (1941).
5. Hankin, "The Fate of the Negative Order Doctrine," 29 GEo. L.J. 977
(1941).
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through the case by case impact of judicial decision. Notwithstanding
the conflicting interests of the war years, we have witnessed a gradual
assimilation of the administrative process into somewhat uncongenial
constitutional framework.
E . Blythe stason t

6. Stason, "Timing of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Administrative Action,"
25 MINN. L. REV. 560 (1941).
7. Moreland, "State Administrative Rules and Regulations," 21 MxcH. S.B.J.
22 (1942).
.
8. Schopflocher, "The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law," 1942
Wxs. L. REv. 5, 198.
9., Vogeler, "Declaratory Rulings in Administrative Agencies," 31 KY. L.J.
20 (1942).
IO. Brown, "Fact and Law in Judicial Review," 56 HARV. L. REv. 899 (1943).
II. Merrill, "Judicial Review of Administrative Proceedings, A Functional Prospectus," 23 NEB. L. REv. 56 (1944).
_
12. Kripke, "A Case Study in the Relationship of Law and Accounting: Uniform
Accounts 100.5 and 107," 57 HARy. L. REv. 433 (1944).
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